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Abstract. In Being and Nothingness Jean-Paul Sartre contends that the self’s funda-
mental relation with the other is one of inescapable conflict. I argue that the research
of the last few decades on the ability of infants – even newborns – to imitate the
facial expressions and gestures of adults provides counter-evidence to Sartre’s claim.
Sartre is not wrong that the look of the other may be a source of self-alienation, but
that is not how it functions in the first instance. An earlier and more primary form of
looking with and at the other is a source of self-discovery. In early imitation, the
infant and adult each see the other not as objects of experience but as subjects of
action. Such looking is necessary for the infant to realize its own potential as a
self-conscious, goal-directed subject of perception and action.
Jean-Paul Sartre’s analysis of the Look of the other and its profound
effect on one’s experience of oneself is perhaps one of the best known
sections of Being and Nothingness. In his discussion of our existence for
others, Sartre contends that the self’s fundamental relation with the other
is one of inescapable conflict. I will argue that the research of the last few
decades on the ability of infants – even newborns – to imitate the facial
expressions and gestures of adults provides counter-evidence to many of
Sartre’s claims about the fundamental relation between the self and oth-
ers.1
This imitative ability of infants is commonly referred to as early imita-
tion. In such imitation one looks at the other but not to make the other an
object, as Sartre contends all looking at another does. That is, one does
not look at the other in order to derealize his possibilities, make them
dead possibilities, override his ends and goals with one’s own or steal his
organization of space. Rather in early imitation one looks at the other in
order to take what is seen and transform it into motor activities of one’s
own body. One internalizes the actions of the other and absorbs them into
one’s own body and its behavior in order to make what one has seen in
looking at the other into what one feels and experiences in the sensorimo-
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tor activities of one’s own body. This is one of the earliest and most
primary forms of our relations with the other and in it we find a kind of
profound unity if not with the particularity of the other’s character and
personality, certainly with the other as a human agent. We find a kind of
species kinship rooted in the characteristics and abilities and physiology
we share because, as human subjects, we are, as Sartre would agree, con-
scious human bodies. More sophisticated forms of interpersonal relations
must be built upon earlier and more primary forms of intersubjectivity,
among which is early imitation. Sartre begins at too advanced a level in his
analysis of our relation with others. At this primary stage our relation with
the other is characterized by union not conflict.
I don’t mean to deny that the Look of the other can do all that Sartre
says it can. That it can produce shame or fear or a counter-response of
pride. My contention is that the Look as a source of self-alienation and
objectification is not the foundation of our relation with others. Looking
both with and at the other serves a positive function in infancy and early
childhood. It’s because I exist for others and others exist for me that I can
develop my capacity for self-directed action and for choosing goals and
ends within the shared space of the world. I will argue that my experience
of the other through my own actions is not, in the first instance at least, a
self-alienation but that it is a discovery and perhaps even a creation of the
self.
In order to see how this empirical research on infants undermines some
of the most fundamental of Sartre’s claims in Being and Nothingness
about our original relation with the other, I will first review the research
findings on infants’ ability to imitate adult behavior. I will follow that
review with a discussion of Sartre’s analysis of our relation with others in
fight of this recent research.
1. Early imitation
The traditional view of infancy
Research conducted over the last twenty years on the imitative ability of
infants – even newborn infants – has challenged many of the more tradi-
tional views of developmental psychologists. One such view, held by Piaget
among others, is about the original nature of human beings. This view
holds that at birth humans are reflexive and nonsocial creatures. As Andrew
Meltzoff notes, Piaget’s description of the newborn’s psychological state
is one of “radical egocentrism” or “solipsism.” For Piaget and others the
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newborn’s reflexive actions of sucking, grasping, crying and so forth are
the material out of which cognitive and social skills must develop.2 Any
early imitative behavior on the infant’s part is, on this view, simply mind-
less, reflexive behavior. This more traditional view also holds that more
complicated forms of imitation, what Piaget called “invisible imitation,”
could not occur until an infant was at least eight to twelve months old.
Invisible imitation is distinguished from manual imitation. Meltzoff and
Keith Moore describe this difference.3 In manual imitation a child imi-
tates an adult action that can be seen by the infant when performed by
himself as well as when performed by the adult. Imitating the hand move-
ments of an adult would be an example of this type of imitation. The
child can use visual input to guide his imitative behavior. But in invisible
imitation the child is imitating behavior that it cannot see in its own case.
Imitation of facial expressions and facial gestures are forms of invisible
imitation. The child must imitate an action it can see the adult perform
but which it cannot see itself perform. The infant must match a behavior
of its own which is felt (kinesthetically/proprioceptively) with a behavior
of another which it sees. As Meltzoff and Moore point out, classical psy-
chological theories argued that this kind of imitation must come later
than manual imitation because of its sophistication and because it re-
quires learning from experience of oneself in mirrors and manual explo-
ration of one’s own and others’ faces.4 Recent research on imitative
behavior in infants has also challenged the traditional focus of most stud-
ies on the development of a concept of self in infants. These studies
focused on the exhibition of self-recognition in the mirror task. This is a
task developed around 1970 by G.G. Gallup to test self-awareness in
primates. “In Gallup’s version, the subject’s forehead and ear were unob-
trusively marked with an odorless red dye, and self-recognition was in-
dexed if the chimps looked in the mirror and then reached up to touch the
marks on their own heads. This behavior was rare to nonexistent in marked
chimps with no mirror and thus attributable to the chimpanzees using the
information in mirrors to tell them about themselves.”5 When this task
was adapted for use with human infants, it was found that they failed to
exhibit self-recognition on this test until eighteen to twenty-four months
of age.6
The research on early imitation, by Meltzoff and Moore in particular,
challenged the view that early human behavior is simply reflexive and
gave evidence that invisible imitation occurs much earlier than Piaget
thought. Meltzoff and Moore argue that studies of imitation and related
phenomena in infants show signs of an earlier, more primitive notion of
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self than that exhibited in mirror studies. For Meltzoff and Moore infants
have an innate sense of the similarity as well as the distinction between
self and others. They believe the fact that even newborns engage in invis-
ible imitation supports such a conclusion. Let us examine the results of
their research to see why they think it challenges so many of the tradi-
tional views of developmental psychologists.
Studies on imitation in infants
Meltzoff and Moore did the earliest studies that showed that very young
infants had the ability to engage in not only manual but also invisible
imitation. In their 1977 study they found that 12 to 21 day old infants
could imitate three adult facial gestures: tongue protrusion, mouth open-
ing and lip protrusion. They found that these young infants were capable
of imitating these facial gestures even if their imitative behavior was
delayed. A pacifier was placed in each of the infant’s mouth while the
adult displayed a particular facial gesture. None of the infants showed
signs of dropping the pacifier and imitating the adult while the adult was
demonstrating the gesture. But once the adult assumed a passive expres-
sion and the pacifier was removed, the infant did imitate the previous
facial gesture of the adult. Since reflexes do not jump temporal gaps,
Meltzoff and Moore argued this delayed imitation was support that imita-
tive behavior in these infants was not simply reflexive behavior.7 A 1982
study of newborns whose average age was thirty-six hours, done by Tiffany
Field and associates, supported Meltzoff’s and Moore’s findings. They
found these newborns could both discriminate and imitate three facial
expressions (happy, sad and surprised).8 Meltzoff and Moore wanted to
show the ability to imitate is present at birth, so they conducted another
study in 1983 in which they tested whether infants from birth to 72 hours
old could imitate two different adult facial gestures: mouth opening and
tongue protrusion. They found that infants this young could imitate these
adult facial gestures; indeed one infant who did so was only 42 minutes
old. They also found that infants worked at perfecting the gesture until it
matched the adults.9 Although the results of these early research findings
were controversial for many years, subsequent confirmations in many
labs, including cross-cultural studies, have now supported and made com-
mon the view that neonates do have the ability to engage in invisible as
well as manual imitation.10
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These demonstrations show that very young infants have the ability to
imitate the facial expressions and gestures of adults even before they
have seen their own faces in a mirror. These examples of early imitation
have several characteristics which support the view that such imitation is
intentional and not mindless, reflexive behavior. First, such imitative be-
havior can occur even if delayed. The delays range from a few minutes to
as much as four months between the actual demonstration of an action
and the infant’s imitation of it.11 Infants work toward correcting mistakes
and matching a visual target.12 They can also imitate novel gestures.13
And they can imitate an intended goal even when the adult’s attempt to
reach that goal is unsuccessful and hence the infant does not see the goal
performed by the adult.14 Most importantly, in invisible imitation they
can imitate an action which they see with bodily movements of their own
which they do not see.
Meltzoff and Moore argue that such imitative ability involves a recog-
nition that others are “like me.” They conclude that such imitative behav-
ior shows a recognition not just that others are like me as “enduring
physical bodies that are like one’s own body and move like one does,”
but that they are intentional systems with beliefs, desires and goals. They
take the fact that by eighteen months old infants can go beyond surface
imitation and imitate acts where an adult intention is unfulfilled as sup-
port for such recognition.15 In a 1994 essay, Meltzoff and Alison Gopnik
argue that the imitative ability of infants shows that they understand that
the bodily movements of others are like my movements and that my move-
ments are like theirs. They think such understanding is the foundation for
“like me” judgments with regard to the psychological states of others.
They suggest that it may well be that our knowledge of the body (our own
and others) is what leads to our knowledge of the mind. They suggest this
because they believe that research showing the imitative abilities of
newborns supports the conclusion “that children innately map certain of
their own internal mental states, particularly their kinesthetic sensations,
onto the bodily movements of others.” So they conclude that knowledge
of self and knowledge of the other develop together.16 Meltzoff argues
for a similar position in a 1993 paper in which he contends that the bridge
between self and other is present at birth. That bridge, he contends, is
shared actions.17
Such shared actions manifest in early imitative behavior show not only
a sense of likeness between the other and myself but also a sense of
differentiation. When an infant imitates the behavior of an adult and of-
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ten works at bringing his gesture in line with the target gesture, it is hard
to deny there is some sense of an equivalence between the action of the
other and the action of oneself. But there is also a distinction between self
and other that is biologically guaranteed since the actions are performed
by two different bodies. Beyond that studies in early imitation suggest,
according to Shaun Gallagher and Meltzoff, that there is a primordial
sense of self “What we might call a proprioceptive self – a sense of self
that involves a sense of one’s motor possibilities, body postures, and
body powers, rather than one’s visual features. The newborn infant’s ability
to imitate others, and its ability to correct its movement, which implies a
recognition of the difference between its own gesture and the gesture of
the other, indicates a rudimentary differentiation between self and
non-self.”18 Another reason invisible imitation ensures a sense of differ-
entiation as well as equivalence between the actions of the self and the
actions of the other is that my own actions are experienced proprioceptively
and not visually while the reverse is true with my experience of the ac-
tions of the other.
Two more points about early imitation should be noted before going on
to discuss Sartre’s analysis in Being and Nothingness of the relation be-
tween the self and others in light of this research. The first is that imita-
tion is two-way and reciprocal. Not only do infants imitate the behavior
of adults, but they can recognize when they are being imitated by adults
and they show special interest in this. In a 1990 study, Meltzoff found
that infants fourteen months old preferred looking at and smiled more at
an experimenter who was imitating them and tested the imitating experi-
menter more to see if he or she were actually imitating them than they did
with a control whether the control person was passive or engaged in
“babylike” actions. Meltzoff concluded from this that infants can recog-
nize structural equivalences between acts they do and acts they see. This
is evidenced both in infants’ imitation of adults and in infants’ recogni-
tion of their being imitated by adults. G. Kugiumutzakis also found spon-
taneous imitations between mothers and young infants both of mothers
imitating infants and infants imitating their mothers.19 One last point to
note with regard to early imitation is that infants imitate people not things.
People are special to us. Young infants are fascinated by the sight of other
human beings.20 As Michael Tomasello notes in an article entitled “On
the Interpersonal Origins of Self-Concept,” “human infants are social crea-
tures from the beginning. They show an interest in people’s faces and
behavior from as early as we care to measure it. . . . They engage in
rhythmic interactions with their caregivers . . . and match their behaviors
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to those of their caregivers within minutes after birth.”21 Keeping the
characteristics of early imitation in mind, let us examine Sartre’s analysis
of the relation between the self and the other as he presents it in Being
and Nothingness.22
2. The Sartrean look
Sartre argues in part three of Being and Nothingness that I come to an
awareness and certainty of the existence of the other through an experi-
ence of being looked at. The look of the other produces in me an experi-
ence of shame or fear because the look always objectifies me. That is, I
am seen as an object by the other. This objectification and its source in
the look of the other is made evident through my experience of shame or
fear. Thus it is through an experience of my own – through my own
subjectivity – that I come to grasp the existence of a consciousness – a
subjectivity – other than my own. My existence for others and the con-
scious experience it creates reveals to me the existence of others. There
can be no direct apprehension of the other’s subjectivity. I grasp it indi-
rectly but with certainty through certain subjective experiences of my
own. These experiences are created by the other’s look. The Look then is
central to Sartre’s analysis of the fundamental and original relation that
exists between the self and others. And the look of the other creates con-
flict between oneself and others. Although my first response to being
objectified by the other – to being made an object of evaluation and judg-
ment in the eyes of the other – is shame or fear, that is often quickly
followed by a counter-response of pride in which I attempt to assert my
subjectivity and make the other an object. In Sartre’s terminology I try to
transcend the other’s transcendence. But the other is not originally re-
vealed to me as an object Sartre contends. If he were he wouldn’t be
revealed as another person, another subject of consciousness. The other is
first experienced as the one who makes me into an object. “My
being-as-object for the Other . . . is the essential structure of our original
relation with the Other.”23 That is, the other is first experienced through
the Look as one who can steal my world, reorient space and what is in it
relative to his ends and goals rather than to mine. The other, Sartre con-
tends, is the death of my possibilities. He limits and restricts them (BN,
264). The other is the “one who looks at me” and gives me an outside, a
nature. And because of that the other is the source of my alienation from
myself since this “outside” is a part of me that I can never fully grasp,
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although I can recognize that it is somehow “me”. But it is a “me,” a part
of myself, the objectified self if you will, that remains within the other
and always outside my reach although not outside my sight. To grasp
myself as an object, I would have to take the viewpoint of the other and
that is a perspective I can be certain exists but I can never occupy. So it is
through the other that I become an object according to Sartre (BN, 280).
It is because of that fact that Sartre believes “I need the Other in order to
realize fully all the structures of my being” (BN, 222) – which is why
Sartre thinks being-for-others is part of the ontological structure of the
for-itself.
Sartre is right about the central importance of looking in the funda-
mental relation between the self and others. But numerous studies in child
development indicate that the primary form of looking occurs first in
experiences such as the interlocking gaze between mother and child so
necessary to a child’s development in the early months of infancy, in the
joint visual attention behavior in which both mother and infant readjust
their gaze to follow the gaze of the other, and in the form of looking that
occurs in early imitation, the behavior I’m focusing on in this paper.
These forms of looking serve a positive function in uniting subjects of
perception and action. For example, the joint “looking at” experienced in
joint visual attention is thought to be an early form of what one researcher
calls the “meeting of minds”24 and appears to help the child learn to
organize space and understand that space is shared by others. In early
imitation “looking at” is mutual between adult and child. Each sees the
other not as an object of experience but first and foremost as a subject of
action. Sartre is right that the other is needed to realize fully all the struc-
tures of my being, but these structures are not limited to or in the first
instance structures of my being as an object for another. Rather I need
these experiences of looking at and with another to realize my own poten-
tial as a self-conscious, goal-directed subject of perception and action.
Through imitation one learns not only about others or about one’s exist-
ence for others, but one learns about one’s own possibilities as an embod-
ied subject of action and consciousness. More importantly for the argument
of this paper, one finds in the infant’s capacity for invisible imitation an
early – if not innate – ability of humans to identify with others of their
kind and to do so at the level of bodily action. The infant looks at the
other not as an object but as a person, as an entity whose movements can
be imitated in the movements of his own body. In invisible imitation this
bodily absorption of the other – the other’s gestures and expressions – is
even more pronounced since the infant must transfer what it sees into an
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experience it feels as a set of sensorimotor activities of its own body. In
early imitation the other’s subjectivity is experienced through one’s own
subjectivity, as Sartre argues it must be, but it is experienced through
oneself as a center of action rather than through one’s experience of shame
or fear. Such experience of imitating the actions of others opens up the
range of possibilities and goal-directed action for the infant rather than
restricting his possibilities. Our original relation with others involves
self-discovery and possibly even self-creation rather than alienation.25
Sartre continues to discuss the self’s relation with others in a section
on the body that immediately follows his discussion of the Look in Being
and Nothingness. Here he distinguishes two aspects of the body’s exist-
ence: (1) my body as it exists for me and (2) my body as it exists for the
other. According to Sartre, I experience my body as it exists for me as a
lived reality not as something known or objectified. But I experience my
body as it exists for others as something objectified. Sartre contends that
no communication is possible between these two levels of my being. But
invisible imitation, I think, reveals the possibility of communication be-
tween these two levels and hence between the self and others. For Sartre
“to study the way in which my body appears to the Other or the way in
which the Other’s body appears to me amounts to the same thing” (BN,
339). Keeping this in mind, I think we can see in invisible imitation the
others body as it is for me (which is the same as my body as it is for the
other) transformed into my body as it is for me. That is, the other’s body
as seen is transformed into my body as lived and experienced, my body
as a center of action. The reason this is possible is because, as early
imitation makes evident, the other’s body as seen is not strictly an object
of attention but can also be perceived as a subject of imitation. Remember
that infants do not try to imitate the actions of objects, but only the ac-
tions of subjects. Sartre is wrong when he contends that before I appre-
hend the other’s body, “I must apprehend the Other first as the one for
whom I exist as an object” (BN, 330). In imitation I apprehend the other
as another subject through apprehending his body, that is, through appre-
hending the movements of his body. I do apprehend the other’s body
through an experience of my own body, as Sartre points out, but not
through an experience of my body as objectified nor of the other’s as the
source of my objectification. I apprehend the other’s body as a subject of
action through the experience of my own body as a subject of action as
well. One of the first signs that I recognize my body as it exists for others
– as an object of awareness – is in the mirror recognition task. Such
self-awareness comes after my absorption of the other’s body as it exists
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for others (as seen) into my body as it exists for me. Sartre says that the
child’s perception of his own body as an object comes after his percep-
tion of the other’s body as an object (BN, 358). That may well be the
case. But it is also true that the child first perceives the other as a bodily
subject of action in order to come to a sense of himself as a bodily subject
of goal-directed action as well. Sartre does acknowledge that my percep-
tion of other people is radically distinct from my perception of things
(BN, 345). The other, he says, is originally given to me as “a body in
situation” (BN, 344). The other’s body appears as a “totality of life and
action,” (BN, 346), as alive, as flesh, as embedded in the world of instru-
ments and actions. But he fails to see that at least one avenue by which
we grasp the other as well as ourself as flesh – as in situation – as alive
and embodied is by absorbing the expressions and gestures of the other
into the movements of our own body.
In the third part of chapter three of Being and Nothingness, Sartre
deals with what he calls our concrete relations with others. There he says
that “the original bond with the Other first arises in connection with the
relation between my body and the Other’s body” (BN, 361). Obviously I
think he’s right about that, but I think he’s wrong in how he interprets
this bond. It is because we are embodied consciousness that we can be
made into objects and make others into objects. It is this constant attempt
to objectify the other which marks, for Sartre, our relations with others.
Even when Sartre complicates his discussion of the objectification in-
volved in our relations with others and acknowledges that we search for
union with the other as well, he still maintains that such union, if possible
at all, is fleeting and simply a temporary “appeasement” at the heart of
the conflict between ourselves and others and not a solution to that con-
flict (BN, 428). Although Sartre thinks our pursuit of union with another
person in love and sexual desire ultimately fails,26 he does allow that
there can be an experience of a plurality of subjects who recognize each
other as centers of subjectivity. This experience of the ‘we’, as Sartre
calls it, comes through common action or a common perception. The best
example of this, he says, is spectators at a theatrical performance united
in a shared experience of the play they are watching. Although there can
be temporary experiences of union with other subjects, this kind of expe-
rience “could not be the foundation of our consciousness of the other”
(BN, 414). The reason it could not is because the two forms of the experi-
ence of being with others that Sartre identifies: the ‘us-object’ and the
‘we-subject’ are, he argues, secondary structures of our existence for oth-
ers. The ‘us-object’ is created when two or more people (an entire op-
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pressed class, for example) are objectified by the look of a third person
(or by the oppressor class). Experiencing union with other subjects is
dependent here on our existence for others and the objectification that
involves. It is in resisting the mutual objectification by a third party that
multiple subjects find temporary union with each other. In discussing the
‘we-subject’, Sartre argues that “it is the world which makes known to us
our belonging to a subject-community, especially the existence of the
world of manufactured objects” (BN, 423). When I use these manufac-
tured objects – the hammer, the jam jar opener, the subway – I am one
among many, part of the ‘they’ who use these objects to pursue common
ends. But such union with others, including the union between spectators
at a play, involves me only as an anonymous “tool user,”’ “subway rider,”
or “play viewer.” Such experience of a we-subject requires some more
primary form of recognition of others’ existence. Sartre claims that to
recognize the other as speaking to me in an “Exit” or “Entrance” sign or
for an object to appear to me as being humanly made as opposed to
unworked upon matter, the other must first be given in some other way.
The only other way possible, on Sartre’s view, is for the other to be given
as the one who looks at me and in doing so objectifies me. Hence, for
Sartre, the experience of the we-subject is just an enrichment of some of
the forms of our existence for others.
But I think that once again Sartre fails to look at more primary and
much earlier forms of self-other relations. These are forms which are
necessary not only for consciousness of others and an awareness of how
others’ consciousness of oneself creates objective aspects of the self, but
also for how I come to self-realization and awareness of myself as a
subject of consciousness. Early imitation as well as related phenomena in
infancy suggest that our existence for ourselves, certainly as subjects of
perception and action, is just as dependent on our existence with others as
it is on our existence for others.27 Even if Sartre were successful in show-
ing these later experiences of union with other subjects are secondary and
dependent on some other way of recognizing the other, my earlier argu-
ments are meant to show that the experience of objectification is not the
only – and most probably not the primary – way of experiencing the other.
3. Possible Sartrean responses
Sartre might respond to my criticisms of his analysis of our original rela-
tions with others by arguing that in early imitation the infant does not yet
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exist for itself, that it is not a self-conscious creature. Therefore studies in
early imitation shed no light on the original relation between the for-itself
and others. But if we recall some of the characteristics of early imitation,
I think they indicate that self-consciousness is present, in at least a primi-
tive form, even in the newborn. The fact that newborns as well as older
infants work at perfecting imitative behavior and matching the facial ges-
tures of adults along with the fact that they are capable of deferred imita-
tion shows that there must be some sense of the self and its gestures as
distinct from the adult and his gestures. Without some bodily sense of
self, how could the infant realize when his gesture has matched that of the
adult? Even within the context of his own analysis of consciousness, Sartre
would have to acknowledge that the infant is self-conscious if he is willing
to accept that the infant is conscious, since one of his fundamental claims
in Being and Nothingness is that all consciousness is self-consciousness.
A stronger Sartrean response could be mounted by appeal to Sartre’s
use of Lewin’s notion of hodological space. Adrian Mirvish does an ex-
cellent job of arguing that one can find the possibility for authentic rela-
tions between the self and the other (especially between parent and child)
in Sartre’s use of this notion of hodological space, that is, space struc-
tured and oriented relative to one’s own goals and ends. Unlike most
commentators who find the possibility for positive human relations only
in Sartre’s later work, Mirvish argues that this possibility is present in
Sartre’s early work despite his negative analysis of our relations with
others in Being and Nothingness. I don’t deny that this possibility is present
in Sartre’s early work and in precisely the place where Mirvish finds it.28
But Mirvish, although he acknowledges that goals can be shared, focuses
on the conflict that inevitably arises because people live in shared space
and hence the way one organizes and structures space may at times con-
flict with how another does. His argument is that this conflict can be
positive. I have no argument with that view. But I think there is an even
more fundamental point to be made in this discussion of space and its
organization relative to one’s goals. The evidence suggests that there
wouldn’t be goal-directedness at all for the infant, at least in terms of
space, unless he had first experienced shared goals, directions and ac-
tions. Unfortunately, although Sartre refers to the notion of hodological
space at least twice in his discussion of our existence for others in Being
and Nothingness (308, 322), he never uses this notion to explore the
possibility for positive human relations.
In conclusion let me offer one reason why Sartre views our fundamen-
tal relation with the other as negative. It is the residue of Cartesianism
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that is present in Being and Nothingness. Although he rejects Descartes’
mind/body dualism and repeats more than once in Being and Nothingness
that it is the body which is the subject of consciousness, he still holds fast
to the Cartesian starting point: the “I think” rather than the “I act.” In the
first part of his discussion of our existence for others, he says “the only
point of departure is the Cartesian cogito” (BN, 251). Earlier he makes a
similar point:
The sole point of departure is the interiority of the cogito. We must
understand by this that each one must be able by starting out from his
own interiority to rediscover the Other’s being as a transcendence which
conditions the very being of that interiority. (BN, 244)
Although our philosophical rediscovery of the other might begin in
interiority, our original relation with the other begins in infancy. We might
say metaphorically that the infant wears his consciousness on the surface
of his body. Long before the development of reflective self-consciousness
and even before there exists the kind of pre-reflective self-awareness Sartre
thinks is primary, that is, a self-awareness that can be made reflective,
there exists a bodily self-awareness which constitutes our most primitive
form of self-consciousness.29 It is precisely in this experience of one’s
own body as a sensorimotor organism, as a perceptual perspective on and
in space, that we first discover the other. Studies in early imitation sup-
port the view that our awareness of others mediates our awareness of
ourselves not only as objects of the judgments of others but as bodily
subjects of perception and action.
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